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“TO ASSEMBLE TOGETHER FOR THEIR
COMMON GOOD”: HISTORY, ETHNOGRAPHY,
AND THE ORIGINAL MEANINGS
OF THE RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND SPEECH
Saul Cornell*
INTRODUCTION
The Whiskey Rebellion is not generally a major focus in constitutional
histories or casebooks. Given this fact, it is hardly surprising that the 1795
case Respublica v. Montgomery1 seldom figures as more than a minor
footnote in scholarly writing about early American constitutional
development, if it receives any attention at all.2 The case has little
precedential value for modern First Amendment doctrine and only
obliquely implicates larger jurisprudential questions about the rights of
assembly and freedom of expression.3 In strictly doctrinal terms,
Montgomery is primarily about the obligation of a justice of the peace to put
down a riot, not an extended judicial disquisition on the meaning of early
American freedom of association or expression.4 Montgomery was one of
several cases that resulted from popular protest during the Whiskey
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University. I would like to
thank Alfred Brophy, Martin Flaherty, Jonathan Gienapp, and Jud Campbell for helpful
suggestions.
1. 1 Yeates 419 (Pa. 1795). The legal and constitutional history of the Whiskey
Rebellion remains largely unwritten. The most important legal study of the Whiskey
Rebellion is Wythe Holt, The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794: A Democratic Working-Class
Insurrection (Jan. 23, 2004) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
2. The standard narrative history does not discuss the case and devotes brief coverage
to the Whiskey Rebellion. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 135–36 (2d ed. 2002). Nor
does the case figure in the standard casebooks by leading scholars. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (3d ed. 2008); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (3d ed.
2008).
3. See infra Part III. Contra Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original
Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1071–75 (2009) (approaching
Montgomery anachronistically and conflating the radically different visions of law at work in
the case).
4. See Montgomery, 1 Yeates at 422. The modern scholarly literature on the right of
assembly is relatively small when compared to the considerable literature on other aspects of
core First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of
Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of
Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH.
L. REV. 639 (2002).
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Rebellion, specifically the raising of liberty poles in sympathy with Western
opponents of the unpopular tax.5 Yet, from the perspective of a new
constitutional historicism, an approach to the constitutional past that unites
elements of a traditional top-down, court-centered narrative and the bottomup perspective inspired by social history and cultural history, Montgomery
is precisely the type of case that can be most illuminating.6 Indeed
Montgomery provides a perfect occasion to engage in a form of historically
grounded “constitutional ethnography.”7
The purpose of such an inquiry is to explore how contests over legal
meaning in the American past shaped the emergence of modern law.
Ethnographic inquiry is holistic in nature.8 Clifford Geertz notes that such
a method invariably requires “[h]opping back and forth between the whole
conceived through the parts that actualize it and the parts conceived through
the whole that motivates them.”9 The consequences of such a holistic
approach to intellectual history have been elaborated by historian and
political theorist Mark Bevir, who argues that meanings derive from the
networks of belief on which they are built.10

5. See infra Part II.
6. For a good sampling of recent work in the new constitutional historicism, see the
essays in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Michael Grossberg & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 2008).
7. In her explication of the goals of constitutional ethnography, Kim Lane Scheppele
captures the essence of such inquiries:
[C]onstitutional ethnography does not ask about the big correlations between the
specifics of constitutional design and the effectiveness of specific institutions but
instead looks to the logics of particular contexts as a way of illuminating complex
interrelationships among political, legal, historical, social, economic, and cultural
elements. The goal of constitutional ethnography is to better understand how
constitutional systems operate by identifying the mechanisms through which
governance is accomplished and the strategies through which governance is
attempted, experienced, resisted and revised, taken in historical depth and cultural
context.
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV.
389, 390–91 (2004).
8. VINCENT DESCOMBES, THE INSTITUTIONS OF MEANING:
A DEFENSE OF
ANTHROPOLOGICAL HOLISM (Stephen Adam Schwartz trans., 2014); Anthropological
Holism, BLACKWELL REFERENCE ONLINE, http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/
tocnode.html?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067952_ss1-152 (last visited Nov. 27,
2015) [http://perma.cc/HV29-FALP].
9. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 69 (1983); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
9–10, 412–53 (1973) [hereinafter GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES].
10. See generally MARK BEVIR, THE LOGIC OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1999)
(synthesizing elements of weak intentionalism, meaning holism, and anti-foundationalist
historicism into a coherent theoretical foundation for historical inquiry). For a more recent
and concise statement of his method, see Mark Bevir, Contextualism: From Modernist
Method to Post-Analytic Historicism, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 211 (2009). For a sympathetic
comment on Bevir’s method that recasts his approach in terms of Grice’s intention-based
semantics and pragmatics and expressly rejects strong holism in favor of moderate holism,
see A. P. Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. HIST. IDEAS 609 (2012).
Although American historians have not engaged with Bevir’s important work in a systematic
fashion, most intellectual and cultural historians would likely find Martinich’s amended
version of Bevir’s model congenial. One important exception to the general lack of attention
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To understand the meaning of post-Revolutionary era constitutional
thought and culture, including the rights of assembly and speech, one must
locate these two concepts in the wider webs of legal and constitutional
belief in place during the Founding era; this process requires a form of thick
contextualism. One must move beyond matters of mere linguistic usage,
speculations about ideal readers, and the thin notions of context associated
with originalist inquiry.11 Instead, one must engage in an archeological
project to uncover the discursive foundations for Founding-era legal and
political ideologies.12 Finally, building on post-Geertzian ethnography and
sociolinguistics, it is essential to start with the fact that post-Revolutionary
era America was not a single homogenous speech community, particularly
when it came to legal and political speech.13 Although English-speaking
Americans may have been part of a single linguistic community, such
commonalities did not obliterate the presence of distinctive political and
legal speech communities shaped by categories such as race, class, gender,
region, ethnicity, religion, and ideology.14 Thus, as Montgomery makes
clear, the views of elite Federalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania were
different in many key areas. Complicating matters further is the issue of
popular constitutionalism.
A distinctive plebeian form of popular

to holism is Jonathan Gienapp’s important Essay in this forum, Historicism and Holism:
Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015).
11. See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
65, 66 (2011). See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 751 (2009); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How
Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037 (2006); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive
Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The
Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
For a sample of some of the emerging critiques of originalism’s theoretical flaws, see
Gregory Bassham & Ian Oakley, New Textualism: The Potholes Ahead, 28 RATIO JURIS 127
(2015); Saul Cornell, Originalism As Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2015), http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/
volume/84/Cornell.pdf [http://perma.cc/4E5Z-PTSN]; Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional
Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 304
(2014).
12. The notion of archeology here draws on Foucault and his analysis of the relationship
between power and discourse. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969). The secondary
literature on Foucault is enormous; good starting points are Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE (May 22, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2014/entries/foucault/ [http://perma.cc/N4JB-TPLL] and THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO MICHEL FOUCAULT (Gary Gutting ed., 2d ed. 2005).
13. For an overview of this literature and its relevance to constitutional history, see
generally Cornell, supra note 11. For a useful introduction to this literature, see Alessandro
Duranti, Ethnography of Speaking: Toward a Linguistics of the Praxis, in 4 LINGUISTICS:
THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY 210, 217 (Frederick J. Newmeyer ed., 1988); Elizabeth Keating,
The Ethnography of Communication, in HANDBOOK OF ETHNOGRAPHY 285, 290–92 (Paul
Atkinson et al. eds., 2007); John J. Gumperz & Jenny Cook-Gumperz, Studying Language,
Culture, and Society: Sociolinguistics or Linguistic Anthropology?, 12 J. SOCIOLINGUISTICS
532 (2008).
14. See Cornell, supra note 11, at 7.
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constitutionalism represented a third constitutional culture and discourse in
play during the Whiskey Rebellion.15
The potential for such a new constitutional historicism to illuminate
Founding-era patterns of thought and belief, including legal ideas, is
enormous. The work of an earlier generation of cultural historians armed
with similar methodological tools radically transformed conventional
intellectual history. Historians such as Rhys Isaac and Robert Darnton
analyzed events at the margin of traditional historical narratives and
transformed them into rich texts for unraveling the cultural history of
Revolutionary-era America and eighteenth-century France.16 The goal of a
new constitutional historicism is analogous: to approach familiar and
unfamiliar legal texts with an appreciation for the complexity and
contingency that defined post-Revolutionary American constitutional
development.17
Montgomery not only demonstrates the contested nature of early
American constitutionalism, it also serves as a reminder that Founding-era
ideas about law, liberty, rights, and even language itself were radically
different than their modern counterparts. This insight has become all the
more valuable given the revival of interest in originalism.18 Rather than
recognize the diversity of Founding-era constitutionalism, most originalist
scholarship approaches the Founding era with a model of consensus history
that was discredited more than a generation ago.19 Originalists have
ignored the diversity and contestation that marked this period and instead
have sought out a fixed original meaning for various provisions of the
Constitution.20 Flux, not fixation, was the defining feature of post15. See generally Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates:
Popular
Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006).
16. See generally ROBERT DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES
IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY (1984); RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA
1740–1790 (1982). On the impact of Geertz on cultural history, see William H. Sewell, Jr.,
Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History:
From Synchrony to Transformation, 59
REPRESENTATIONS 35 (1997).
17. Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring Legacy
of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385 (2014). As Jack Rakove’s important
contribution to this forum makes clear, one need not embrace any of Beard’s materialistic
assumptions to recognize the revolutionary ferment in the period between the American
Revolution and the framing of the Constitution. See Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past:
More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2015).
Moreover, Rakove wisely notes that constitutional communication in a revolutionary age
shares very few features with ordinary conversation, a fact which makes the turn to ordinary
language philosophy models by some originalists all the more puzzling and problematic. See
Solum, supra note 11.
18. For an overview of recent debates over originalist methodology, see generally Keith
E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).
19. See generally Cornell, supra note 11. On consensus history, see John Higham,
Changing Paradigms: The Collapse of Consensus History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 460 (1989) and
Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q.
1 (1993).
20. Virtually all forms of the so-called new originalism begin with an unexamined set of
assumptions about language, history, and meaning that rest on a vision of consensus history
that is untenable. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Revolutionary era legal and political discourse. To the degree that ideas
were fixed, this process was remarkably short-lived and dependent on
political and ideological forces. As political times changed and new
theoretical insights emerged, alternative readings of the Constitution
proliferated with them.21
One key aspect of the new constitutional historicism is its emphasis on
exploring popular constitutionalism as a vital force in the early Republic.22
Restoring a voice to individuals and groups that have been drowned out or
silenced in standard accounts serves several purposes.23 The most obvious
advantage of including such voices is that it serves as a reminder that early
American constitutionalism was a contentious and sometimes raucous
debate.24 The new constitutionalism does not seek to substitute a new
heroic counternarrative in place of traditional accounts.25 The point of
recovering neglected voices is not to substitute their vision of law for the
more familiar ones of James Madison or John Marshall, but rather to show
how early American constitutional development was contested and
contingent from the beginning and did not unfold in an inexorable
manner.26 Although the focus on a minor case may seem odd, it is
important to recall that discussions of Balinese cockfights27 and tales about
angry apprentices massacring cats in eighteenth-century France28 did not
seem all that important in the grand scheme of things prior to the work of
ethnographically oriented scholars.29 Applying this approach to seemingly
minor texts has helped historians unearth the underlying structures of power
that have shaped culture and politics.30 An understanding of these forgotten
21. Madison’s evolving constitutional thought provides the most obvious example of
how changed circumstances and new theoretical insights transform constitutional meaning
over time. On Madison’s evolving thought, see generally DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF
THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY (1989).
22. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
23. See generally Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 721 (2013) (analyzing the flaws in originalist approaches to the past and suggesting the
promise of intellectual history as a method for discovering the meanings of historical legal
texts); Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Language: Pragmatics, Poetics, and Social Power, 23 ANN.
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 435 (1994) (exploring the potential of the methods of linguistic
anthropology and the ethnography of speaking to illuminate the connections among law,
discourse, and power); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the
Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011) (discussing the
need to recover the Founding era’s very different views about language in general and
constitutional communication in particular).
24. See generally Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution Vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 295 (2011).
25. See generally Cornell, supra note 17.
26. See generally id.
27. See GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 9, at 412–53.
28. See DARNTON, supra note 16.
29. On the contribution of these scholars and others influenced by Geertz, see generally
Sewell, Jr., supra note 16.
30. For two critiques of Darnton’s method that underscore the centrality of his approach
to recent cultural history, see generally Dominick LaCapra, Chartier, Darnton, and the
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pasts is a necessary first step toward making sense of the present and
charting a course for the future.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DRAMAS OUT OF DOORS
Federalist policies in the years after ratification were shaped by
Alexander Hamilton’s bold economic agenda.31 The ambitious Secretary of
the Treasury believed that America’s future depended on creating a
powerful military and fiscal state based on the British model.32 To
accomplish this goal, America needed sources of revenue, which meant
imposing new taxes.33 In 1791, the Federalist-dominated Congress adopted
a tax on distilled grain (“the whiskey tax”), triggering protests across a
broad swath of the backcountry running from Pennsylvania through
Virginia to Kentucky.34 The whiskey tax fell hardest on the farmers in
these regions who distilled their grains into hard spirits, which not only
fetched a higher price at market, but also were far cheaper to transport to
eastern consumers.35 In Kentucky, opposition to the tax was so pervasive it
was virtually impossible to collect any revenue or prosecute tax
resistance.36 Opposition to the excise in western Pennsylvania was also
intense, but resistance in this region did not achieve the same level of
cohesion as it did in Kentucky.37 One important difference between the two
regions was the role played by local elites. In Kentucky, opposition to the
tax enjoyed considerable support from the local elites.38 The middling
yeoman elite who dominated politics in western Pennsylvania opposed
Federalist policy, but their sympathy with the grievances of the protestors
stopped short of support for extralegal action or armed resistance.39
Protest in western Pennsylvania had begun peacefully, but hardly
deferentially. Opposition to the excise drew on a rich tradition of plebeian
Great Symbol Massacre, 60 J. MOD. HIST. 95 (1988) and Harold Mah, Suppressing the Text:
The Metaphysics of Ethnographic History in Darnton’s Great Cat Massacre, 31 HIST.
WORKSHOP J. 1 (1991). On the impact of cultural history on American history, see Casey
Nelson Blake, Culturalist Approaches to Intellectual History, in A COMPANION TO
AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY 383 (Karen Halttunen ed., 2008).
31. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993);
JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN
CRISIS (1993).
32. See generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003).
33. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815 141 (2009).
34. TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE
TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 221 (2007).
35. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46–60 (1986).
36. See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, A New Look at the Whiskey Rebellion, in THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 97, 110–11 (Steven R. Boyd ed.,
1985).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 110.
39. WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:
GEORGE WASHINGTON,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006); SLAUGHTER, supra note 35.
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rituals of protest and communal justice.40 Threatening pseudonymous notes
appeared in the press and on public placards with the signature of “Tom the
Tinker,” who threatened to “mend” the stills of whiskey producers with
lead from his musket.41 Tax collectors were burned in effigy and in some
instances subjected to the painful and humiliating process of being tarred
and feathered.42 By 1794, anger and frustration over the excise reached a
crisis point.
No local figure was more despised in western Pennsylvania than excise
officer John Neville.43 Born into an affluent planter family in Virginia,
Neville was a Federalist in politics and an aristocrat by bearing.44 A rich
land speculator, he had made huge profits in western Pennsylvania land
transactions.45 Neville’s country estate, Bower Hill, was situated atop a hill
with a commanding view of the countryside in what is now Allegheny
County.46 While most western Pennsylvanians lived in simple cabins of
rough-hewn logs, hovels by comparison with Bower Hill, Neville’s
mansion was lavishly appointed with fine furniture and carpets in every
room.47 The walls of his home were adorned with over two dozen
paintings, and he boasted a fine gentleman’s library that contained richly
bound leather volumes and finely illustrated maps.48 Bower Hill was
among the grandest structures in all of western Pennsylvania.49 In short, in
an area in which most families lived close to subsistence, Neville lived in
high aristocratic style.50
On July 17, 1794, a crowd of over five hundred armed tax protestors
marched on Bower Hill.51 Aware of the rising levels of violence in the
region and fearing the wrath of the mob, Neville requested a detachment of
federal soldiers to guard his house, and he even took the unusual precaution
of arming his slaves.52 When the protestors arrived, shots were exchanged,
and in the resulting melee, two protestors, including a popular
40. See generally HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE, INCIDENTS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE
WESTERN PARTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1795); WILLIAM FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE
INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN COUNTIES OF PENNSYLVANIA (1796). On plebeian
traditions of protest, see generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788–1828 (1999); RIOT AND
REVELRY IN EARLY AMERICA (William Pencak et al. eds., 2002); Alfred F. Young, English
Plebeian Culture and Eighteenth-Century American Radicalism, in THE ORIGINS OF ANGLOAMERICAN RADICALISM 185 (Margaret Jacob & James Jacob eds., 1984); Peter Linebaugh,
All the Atlantic Mountains Shook, 10 LABOR/LE TRAVAILLEUR 87 (1982).
41. HOGELAND, supra note 39, at 130.
42. BOUTON, supra note 34, at 224.
43. SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, at 115, 179.
44. Id. at 152.
45. Id.
46. See id. On the material culture of Neville’s estate, see RONALD C. CARLISLE, THE
STORY OF “WOODVILLE”: THE HISTORY, ARCHITECTURE, AND ARCHAEOLOGY OF A WESTERN
PENNSYLVANIA FARM 70–77 (1998).
47. SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, at 152.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 179.
52. Id. at 180.
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Revolutionary War veteran and a federal soldier, were slain.53 The
incensed crowd set Bower Hill ablaze, and by the following morning
Neville’s grand estate was reduced to ashes.54 House attacks were also part
of plebeian culture and generally did not result in the kind of violence and
devastation visited on Bower Hill. Typically, angry crowds targeted luxury
goods; such actions were a direct assault on some of the most ostentatious
symbols of status and wealth.55 In the cases of more serious attacks, a
home might literally be disassembled and torn down.56 Such actions served
as a powerful reminder to elites that homes erected with the labor of
ordinary folk could literally be brought low by the awesome power of the
people. The exchange of gunfire at Neville’s home changed the nature of
this traditional script. Rather than follow the customary pattern of ritual
house assault, events at Bower Hill spun out of control. Instead of
“deconstructing” Neville’s home, the incensed mob utterly destroyed it,
leaving little to salvage.
Although the state of Pennsylvania initially rejected offers of federal
assistance to deal with western unrest, the intensification of violence,
including the events at Bower Hill, impelled the Washington
Administration to take decisive action to end the protests—by force if
necessary.57 After consulting with his Cabinet, which was divided over the
appropriate course of action, Washington adopted a two-prong strategy to
end the insurrection.58 A group of federal commissioners was appointed to
meet with rebels and protesters.59 The commission would offer amnesty for
an immediate cessation of hostilities and all acts of lawlessness, but it
would not assent to any political concessions.60 In the likely event that
protestors refused to stand down, Washington also prepared to mobilize
over 12,000 militia members from the neighboring states of Pennsylvania,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia.61 The Pennsylvania liberty pole cases
emerged in the midst of this tumult.
II. LIBERTY POLES: NATIONALIST ICON OR PLEBEIAN STANDARD?
Few political symbols were as powerful and as malleable as the liberty
pole. In the iconography of early American political culture, the image of
the classical Goddess of Liberty nestling under her arm a pole topped by a
cap drew on a symbolic tradition stretching back to ancient Rome.62 In the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., PETER SHAW, AMERICAN PATRIOTS AND THE RITUALS OF REVOLUTION 197–
200 (1981); ROBERT BLAIR ST. GEORGE, CONVERSING BY SIGNS: POETICS OF IMPLICATION IN
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND CULTURE 205–97 (1998).
56. ST. GEORGE, supra note 55, at 205–97.
57. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush
the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 575.
60. Id. at 575–76.
61. Id. at 578–79.
62. See generally E. McClung Fleming, From Indian Princess to Greek Goddess: The
American Image, 1783–1815, 3 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 37 (1967).
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Roman Republic, the ritual of freeing a slave included placing a cap on the
emancipated slave’s head.63 The revival and rediscovery of the liberty pole
and cap in the modern era occurred in the seventeenth-century Dutch
struggle for independence from Spain.64 To appeal to their countrymen,
Dutch artists modernized the ancient cap, replacing it with the broadbrimmed hat more typical of contemporary Dutch fashion.65 During the
English Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century, the supporters of
the Dutch prince William of Orange brought over this symbol of the liberty
pole and cap.66 Eventually, artists dropped the Dutch-style hat in favor of a
more traditional Roman-style cap.67 During the eighteenth century, the
Whig supporters of parliamentary power adopted this image as their own.68
The American Revolution popularized the image of the liberty pole,
which was widely used as a symbol in political cartoons and was reborn and
brought to life as a popular political symbol in the maritime community of
New York.69 After the repeal of the Stamp Act, New Yorkers, led by
workers from the maritime trades, known as the “Jack Tars,” set up a mast
or flagpole near the British army barracks in the city.70 The location of the
pole, in the backyard of British troops, only underscored the provocative
nature of raising the pole.71 The pole flew flags with a variety of messages,
including the word “LIBERTY” for all to see.72 British troops viewed the
pole as an insult and attacked it on multiple occasions.73 In this escalating
conflict between New Yorkers and British forces, multiple efforts were
made to buttress the pole, which became known as “the Liberty Pole.”74 As
violence between the opposing sides escalated, the pole came to resemble
an armed ship’s mast, encased in metal plates and studded with nails to
impede efforts to chop it down.75 New Yorkers also posted a guard around
their new standard to prevent future attacks.76
In the period after the Revolution, the icon of the liberty pole proliferated
along with images of the Goddess of Liberty, a fitting symbol for the new
American Republic.77 The classical image of the Goddess of Liberty had
been domesticated and Americanized. In some cases, Columbia, an
Americanized version of Britannia, stood in for the Goddess of Liberty.78
63. See generally J. David Harden, Liberty Caps and Liberty Trees, 146 PAST &
PRESENT 66 (1995).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 73.
66. Id. at 74.
67. Id. at 91–102.
68. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, LIBERTY AND FREEDOM 41–42, 48–49 (2005).
69. Id. at 38–41.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 44.
72. Id. at 46.
73. Id. at 43–47.
74. Id. at 46.
75. Id. at 46–47.
76. ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 351 (2006).
77. BARBARA GROSECLOSE, NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN ART 64–65 (2000).
78. Id. at 64.
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Columbia typically sported some element of stylized “native” clothing to
signal America’s hybrid nature as a product of both the old world and the
new.79 Columbia also was often portrayed with a liberty pole and cap.80
Images of Columbia and Liberty could be found emblazoned on pottery,
adorning the covers of magazines, and even used as a model for women’s
samplers and other forms of needlework.81
The intensity of ideological conflict and rising partisanship in the 1790s
tested the limits of America’s commitment to the ideals of liberty. It is easy
to forget how fraught American politics was in the years immediately
following the adoption of the Constitution.82 Not only did the ratification
of the Constitution not alleviate the profound divisions in American
politics, if anything, the outbreak of the French Revolution exacerbated
There was a brief period when Federalists and
these tensions.83
Republicans each rallied around the cause of the French Revolution, but
this harmony collapsed as events in France moved in an increasingly radical
direction.84 By the middle of the 1790s, loyalty to France or her opponent,
Great Britain, was a defining feature of American politics.85 For
Federalists, the Jacobin ideas of the French Revolution were a cautionary
reminder that radical ideas, including homegrown ones spouted by
Jefferson and other Republicans, threatened the core values of the American
Revolution and the future of America’s constitutional experiment.86
Republicans were no less ardently convinced that Federalists sought to
refashion America in the image of Great Britain and destroy the democratic
and egalitarian achievements of the American Revolution.87 By the end of
the decade, political animosities had reached such a level of partisan fervor
that President John Adams requested that his home residence be fortified
with weaponry borrowed from the Department of War to prevent mob
actions against him for being pro-British.88
Given the increasingly tense atmosphere of the 1790s, it is remarkable
that America could find any common political images or icons to rally
around. One of the images that was sorely tested during this period was the
liberty pole. Although the feminized Goddess of Liberty holding a pole
continued to adorn a range of objects and figures in paintings and popular

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63.
Id.
ANDREW BURSTEIN & NANCY ISENBERG, MADISON AND JEFFERSON (2010); JOHN
FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2003);
WOOD, supra note 33.
83. See generally Matthew Rainbow Hale, American Hercules: Militant Sovereignty
and Violence in the Democratic-Republican Imagination, 1793–1795, in BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND ANARCHY:
THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 243 (Patrick Griffin et al. eds., 2015).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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prints, the physical act of raising a liberty pole became more vexed.89
There was a brief period in the early 1790s when liberty poles did play a
role in public culture that transcended the growing partisan divisions
agitating the nation, but this period did not last long.90 From the outset,
there were always some important differences between the way liberty
poles were deployed in Federalist events and the way they were used in
more spontaneous protests by plebeian crowds.91 Federalist liberty pole
raisings were generally staged in a way that underscored the value of
hierarchy and a vision of well-regulated or ordered liberty.92 Events such
as Washington’s birthday were perfect occasions to make use of the
powerful symbolism of the liberty pole because the ceremonies of the day
effectively contained its potentially radical message.93 These occasions
were designed to promote consensus and evoke themes of nationalism and
unity. Militia units often participated in these events, but they acted in an
official capacity and adhered to the hierarchies of rank.94 The signs,
banners, placards, and toasts offered up on these occasions also served the
ideological goal of promoting deference to a virtuous elite, with
Washington himself serving as the best expression of this idea.95 Specific
toasts lauded the actions of other leading Federalists such as Adams, Jay,
and Hamilton.96 By the time of the Whiskey Rebellion, the use of liberty
poles as a prop in public rituals by Federalists was waning.97 Indeed, the
emergence of a radical plebeian street culture, in which liberty poles played
a vital role during the Whiskey Rebellion, led many Republicans to distance
themselves from this potent symbol.98
Although one must approach accounts of liberty pole raisings in the
Federalist press with some caution, these descriptions characterize such
events as “disorderly” and “riotous.”99 Additionally, the composition of the
crowds associated with them was often disparaged. One writer described
them as composed of men of “low birth” who were “without property.”100
89. Id.
90. See generally SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET:
FESTIVE CULTURE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1997) (exploring the way public
political culture was colored by partisan divisions).
91. DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1776–1820 (1997) (analyzing the tensions between rituals of
nationalism and political dissent).
92. NEWMAN, supra note 90, at 172–76.
93. Id. at 61.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 173.
98. Republican rituals stood somewhere between the elite vision of Federalists and the
more rough and tumble majoritarian rituals favored by plebeians. Moreover, Republicans, at
least in the midst of the Whiskey Rebellion, were forced to distance themselves from such
events in response to Federalist criticism. See FINDLEY, supra note 40, at 213. During the
crisis associated with the Sedition Act, Republicans rehabilitated the ritual of raising the
liberty pole. See NEWMAN, supra note 90, at 174.
99. Extract of a Letter from a Gentleman in Hagerstown, GAZETTE OF THE UNITED
STATES, Oct. 4, 1794, at 2.
100. Id.
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Nor is it surprising that Federalists would denounce the liberty poles as
“false” standards of liberty and deride them as “anarchy poles.”101
The slogans favored by the plebeian crowds associated with the use of
liberty poles were more aggressive and egalitarian than those that had been
deployed in the nationalist rituals of unity staged by Federalists.102 Signs
on plebeian poles proclaimed, “Liberty or Death,”103 or voiced the ideal of
“Equal Taxation.”104 Instead of honoring the hierarchies of rank, plebeian
rituals such as these were infused with a more egalitarian spirit and boasted
a more carnival-like atmosphere.105
III. REPUBLICAN LIBERTY AND
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE STREETS
It was in the midst of this tense, politically volatile setting that Justice of
the Peace Daniel Montgomery found himself having to make a difficult
choice about the raising of a liberty pole in the public streets of
Northumberland, Pennsylvania.106 The basic facts in Respublica v.
Montgomery were not disputed by either side. Judge William Wilson and
Magistrate William Cooke sought Montgomery’s assistance to disperse a
crowd of pro-Whiskey Rebellion protestors and tear down their “liberty
pole (falsely so called).”107 Rather than assist them, Montgomery
expressed his sympathy with the protestors, declaring that the assembled
crowd “were determined to have their grievances redressed,” and they
“would erect the pole.”108 Not only were the actions of the protestors
legitimate, Montgomery confessed that “for his part he would put to his
shoulder to lift or pull at the rope, if required by the ‘people.’”109
Wilson subsequently charged him with failing to uphold his office as a
conservator of the peace.110 The only legal justification and plausible
defense Montgomery might have mounted was that his actions had been
motivated by simple prudence and a desire to avoid further violence, which
is precisely what he ended up arguing in his defense.111 The court rejected
his defense and concluded that his actions were not simply expedient, not a
calculated attempt to avoid possible death or injury at the hands of the
angry crowd and avoid a bad situation becoming worse:
If his conduct arose from weak nerves, or an imperious necessity, he
would fairly have declared so upon oath; but his expressions shew that his
errors were not confined to his head; they reached his heart; and, at the

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

KLINE’S CARLISLE WEEKLY GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 1794, at 2.
NEWMAN, supra note 90, at 174–76.
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Sept. 17, 1794, at 2.
BALTIMORE DAILY INTELLIGENCER, Sep. 10, 1794, at 3.
YOUNG, supra note 40, at 349.
See Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates 419 (Pa. 1795).
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419–20.
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time of the riot, he could not have been considered as even a neutral
character.112

The court determined that he had not acted out of prudence, but out of
political sympathy with the protest.113 The facts of the case do seem to
warrant this conclusion about Montgomery’s state of mind and intentions.
Montgomery’s own statements and the affidavits produced certainly
support such a conclusion.114 Montgomery had not simply refused to
disperse the crowd; he had admitted that he gladly would have assisted
them in raising the pole. Montgomery’s subsequent actions also confirm
that he supported the crowd’s actions. Following the first confrontation,
Wilson returned armed to the scene to break up the illegal assembly. As the
court record makes clear:
An affray took place between one of the rioters and a friend to good order,
and some blows passed. Mr. Wilson read what he called the riot act, to
induce the multitude to disperse, but they refused. One of them presented
a musket at him, and he presented his pistol also.115

In response to this turn of events, Montgomery proceeded against Wilson
for drawing his weapon, not against the members of the crowd and its
leaders.116 Thus, Montgomery viewed Wilson, not the rioters, as the
aggressor in this situation and the one responsible for committing the
affray.117
If the assembly were a riot, or even a tumultuous assembly, the
obligations of a peace officer were clear. Montgomery would have been
duty bound to assist Wilson in putting down the riot and would have been
justified in using force, including armed force, if necessary.118 Indeed,
under such circumstances it would have been the legal obligation of every
citizen to assist the justice of the peace and restore order.119 If the protest
was a riot, then Wilson was legally justified in brandishing his weapon.
The fact that Montgomery charged Wilson, not the protestors, with an

112. Id. at 420.
113. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1073–74 (approaching Montgomery from an anachronistic
point of view). Volokh misconstrues Judge Addison’s views on liberty poles, failing to note
that Addison believed they were a public nuisance regardless of any seditious intent. Thus,
in contrast to other examples of speech and the press, simply raising a pole was a crime. To
establish the equivalence central to Volokh’s argument, one would have to conclude that
publishing a blank newspaper and distributing it in public was itself a crime, a conclusion
that is hard to credit. Moreover, Volokh tends to blur together the views of Federalists and
Republicans, ignores plebeian thought, and conflates attitudes expressed in 1794 during the
Whiskey Rebellion with subsequent views articulated later during the Sedition crisis. Id. at
1072–74.
114. Montgomery, 1 Yeates at 419–20.
115. Id. at 419.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law regarding affray, riot, and the duties of peace
officers in such circumstances, see THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND
AUTHORITY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS,
CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 300–09 (1794).
119. Id. at 11.
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affray further underscores the fact that Montgomery believed the protestors’
actions were legal and constitutionally protected.120
IV. FEDERALISTS, REPUBLICANS, AND PLEBEIANS:
THE CONTESTED MEANING OF RIGHTS IN THE WHISKEY REBELLION
The legal issues raised by Montgomery demonstrate a deep divide over
the meaning and scope of the rights of assembly and speech.121 The
Federalist view was captured by Judge Alexander Addison in a case
originating in Pittsburgh, closer to the center of the protest. Addison
explained that the raising of a liberty pole was, at a very minimum, a public
nuisance if it were done on public property without legal sanction.122
Raising a pole might also, depending on the circumstances and the intent of
the parties, be riotous or seditious even if it were done on private land.123
In short, for Addison and most Federalists, the only time in which the
raising of a liberty pole was legal was when the action was undertaken as
part of a public celebration, sanctioned by law.
Addison’s legal position was clearly spelled out in his decision in
Pennsylvania v. Morrison.124 In that case, Addison averred that “the act of
raising a pole in the street is itself unlawful, independent of any other ill
intention.”125 In the case of the pole at issue in Morrison, and similar acts
across western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion, it was beyond
dispute “that the intention was unlawful opposition to the government.”126
In short, Addison did not believe that individuals or groups of individuals
had a constitutionally protected right of assembly or speech that included
such actions.127 The notion that groups of individuals might set themselves
up as intermediaries between the people and their government was, in
Addison’s view, the very worst form of factionalism.128 Addison and other
Federalists had used the same logic to denounce the Democratic-Republican
societies that had emerged across the United States in the previous year.
Although not officially linked to the Republican movement in any formal or
systematic fashion, most of the societies had close ties to local Republicans.
120. Montgomery, 1 Yeates at 419–20.
121. Obviously protestors in Northumberland and in other parts of western Pennsylvania
believed that the use of liberty poles was constitutionally protected. See Holt, supra note 1,
at 18–21.
As Holt notes, Federal Attorney William Rawle instigated twenty-six misdemeanor
charges for speech-related infractions arising from the Whiskey Rebellion, the most common
type of prosecution involving liberty poles. Id. at 75. Federal grand juries were exceedingly
reluctant to indict defendants, and in those instances in which Rawle was able to move to
trial, he encountered even greater resistance. Id. at 75.
122. See Pennsylvania v. Morrison, 1 Add. 274 (1795).
123. ALEXANDER ADDISON, REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COUNTY COURTS OF THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT, AND IN THE HIGH COURT OF ERRORS & APPEALS, OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
AND CHARGES TO GRAND JURIES OF THOSE COUNTY COURTS 2:268 (1800).
124. 1 Add. 274 (1795); see also, ADDISON, supra note 123, at 1:274–76.
125. ADDISON, supra note 123, at 1:276.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1:275–76.
128. Id. at 2:268.
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Their goal was to influence public opinion. In addition to publishing their
sentiments about political issues, the societies staged celebrations, gave
festive dinners, and sponsored public orations. Republicans viewed the
societies as a way to improve understanding of political issues and refine
public opinion. Federalists, including Addison, denounced them for
encouraging disharmony and suspicion. For Federalists, such “self-created
societies” were little more than factions whose activities sowed discord and
corrupted politics.129 Given this view, it made perfect sense that Federalists
denounced them and blamed the Democratic-Republican societies for
paving the way for the Whiskey Rebellion.130
Republican attitudes toward the Democratic-Republican societies and
their views of liberty poles were a mirror image of their Federalist
opponents’ views. Republicans believed that the societies served a vital
role by diffusing information and providing an institutional site for public
debate and reasoned discussions.131 The logic of this argument also applied
to the use of liberty poles. If groups of citizens were legally entitled to
gather together on matters of public concern, the use of a liberty pole as a
rallying point could hardly be illegal.132 Instead of viewing them as
“anarchy poles,” as Federalists did, Republicans embraced them as part of
America’s revolutionary heritage and a potent reminder of the hard-won
liberties gained by independence.133 William Findley, one of the most
prominent Republican politicians in western Pennsylvania, defended both
of these positions at the outset, but as violence spread and Federalists
intensified their attacks on pole raisings, he was forced to concede that the
use of them in the current context of the western Pennsylvania insurrection
had become so closely identified with armed resistance as to be
indisputably seditious.134 Still, Findley refused to accept that the liberty
pole could not again serve as a symbol of freedom or tool of legitimate
protest. The legality of raising a pole, he argued, depended entirely on the
intent of those raising the pole and the circumstances in which they
acted.135 Despite his best efforts to assert a more expansive vision of
freedom of assembly and the right of symbolic speech (one far closer in

129. ALBRECHT KOSCHNIK, LET A COMMON INTEREST BIND US TOGETHER: ASSOCIATIONS,
PARTISANSHIP, AND CULTURE IN PHILADELPHIA, 1775–1840, at 24–40 (Jan Ellen Lewis et al.
eds., 2007). See generally Albrecht Koschnik, The Democratic Societies of Philadelphia and
the Limits of the American Public Sphere, Circa 1793–1795, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 615
(2001).
130. See generally Johann N. Neem, Freedom of Association in the Early Republic: The
Republican Party, The Whiskey Rebellion, and the Philadelphia and New York Cordwainers’
Cases, 127 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 259 (2003).
131. See KOSCHNIK, supra note 129, at 37–40.
132. For a good sampling of recent work on the early American public sphere,
particularly the role of counter publics and contestation in the public sphere, see Forum:
Alternative Histories of the Public Sphere, 62 WM. & MARY Q. 1 (2005).
133. NEWMAN, supra note 90, at 174.
134. FINDLEY, supra note 40, at 213.
135. Id.
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spirit to modern First Amendment doctrine), Findley’s views remained a
minority point of view, and he was forced to accept defeat in 1794.136
The views of Montgomery and the plebeian protestors in
Northumberland were also decisively defeated for the moment. Federalists
employed the well-regulated militia protected by the Second Amendment as
an agent of repression, not a final check on federal tyranny as some AntiFederalists had hoped.137 The Whiskey Rebellion quickly collapsed in the
face of federal power.
To understand what freedom of assembly and speech meant to the parties
in Montgomery, one must connect them to the wider web of beliefs shaping
the way Federalists and plebeians approached law and politics. Neither side
supported the type of modern, liberal rights-based vision of assembly or
speech that is central to First Amendment doctrine.138
The plebeian conception of the rights of assembly and speech was closely
connected to a communitarian understanding of liberty. It was not a
progenitor for a modern-style theory of expressive rights or associational
rights. The language used by Montgomery to defend his actions
underscores this point: he defended the raising of a liberty pole because it
expressed the will of the local community, not because there was a broad
individual right to express one’s views, even when those views were
unpopular.139 It is doubtful that Montgomery or any members of the liberty
pole crowds in western Pennsylvania would have defended the rights of
unpopular minority voices to speak. In Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a scene of
vibrant protests during the insurrection, pro-Whiskey Rebellion protestors
shouted down their opponents, hardly the type of actions one would expect
from protestors driven by a libertarian ideal.140 A close look at the actions
of the Whiskey Rebellion rebels themselves dispels any lingering doubts
about the collective nature of their protests, which shared little with
libertarian theories of rights. The rebels drew on a variety of plebeian
practices and rituals designed to intimidate and silence those who opposed
their cause.141 Harassment sometimes took the form of burning individuals
in effigy, a symbolic humiliation, but there were also cases of brutal
physical harassment, including the use of tar and feathers.142 Thus, the
plebeian conception of freedom of assembly and speech evidenced in
Montgomery showed little, if any, tolerance for views at odds with those of

136. Id.
137. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 114 (2006).
138. See generally Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353 (2000) (tracing the development of the current
understanding of the Free Speech Clause). On assembly, see the works cited supra note 4.
139. See supra notes 107–09, 114–17 and accompanying text.
140. DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 20, 1794, at 2.
141. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
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the local community. The goal of the protest was to promote and affirm
community solidarity, not to encourage a robust marketplace of ideas.143
Modern “rights talk” generally is cast in liberal individualistic terms.144
By contrast, the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 makes it
exceedingly clear that the right to assemble and speak was still framed in a
republican idiom.145 Both the language and substance of “rights talk” in
post-Revolutionary America was steeped in ideas and beliefs quite alien to
modern legal discourse.146 Rights in the Founding era were generally
derived from an eclectic set of sources, including Enlightenment thought,
common law, civic humanism, republicanism, and American experience
both during the Revolution and the Confederation Period.147 Indeed, the
text of the Pennsylvania Constitution expressly framed both assembly and
speech in terms of the common good, not in terms of a right of individual
expression or the right of individuals to associate:
That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together
for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by
petition, address, or remonstrance.148

The language of Pennsylvania’s 1790 provision asserted that the exercise of
this right was shaped by the purpose of furthering the “common good.”149
It is hard to think of any modern rights provision that qualifies its purpose
in such terms. Yet, such language was common in many of the first state

143. For explorations of plebeian constitutionalism in this era, see generally CORNELL,
supra note 40. See also Cornell, supra note 24, at 324.
144. Similar republican language was used in a number of other state constitutions from
the period. See NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 140–41 (1997). For a good introduction to modern rights theory, see
Leif Wenar, Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sep. 9, 2015), http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/ [http://perma.cc/55QK-KWXM] and Kenneth
Campbell, Legal Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 20, 2013), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/ [http://perma.cc/F2N7-HHBM].
145. Frank Lovett, Republicanism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/republicanism/
[http://perma.cc/N2BFPCPA] is particularly helpful in distinguishing republicanism from the related tradition of
civic humanism and the alternative tradition of rights-based liberalism. Although useful as
analytical tools, one must apply these philosophical categories with a good deal of caution.
The state constitutions from this period, including Pennsylvania’s, were not the products of a
deliberative process involving philosophers, but were the outcome of contentious political
processes that involved a multitude of individuals whose constitutional ideas were often
inchoate. The bodies drafting these constitutions reflected a broad range of beliefs,
experiences, and levels of erudition. See Rakove, supra note 17.
146. On the contrast between modern rights theory and the language of rights in the
Founding era, see RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999). On
early modern conceptions of rights, see KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (1996); Victoria Kahn,
Early Modern Rights Talk, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391 (2001).
147. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
148. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 20.
149. Id.
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constitutions.150 Pennsylvania’s provision further specified the manner in
which these lawful goals might be legitimately pursued: “by petition,
address, or remonstrance.”151 Although individuals were the holders of
these rights, their exercise was framed as a civic enterprise.152
It is easy to see why Judge Addison and other Federalists might conclude
that assembling to raise a liberty pole was neither a protected form of
assembly nor speech. Rather than serve the common good, Federalists such
as Addison were likely to see such actions as divisive and the very
antithesis of the goal of promoting the common good.153 In contrast to
legitimate forms of political expression, such as petition, addresses, or
remonstrance, the use of a liberty pole was calculated to inflame passions,
not promote reasoned discourse. The type of street theater associated with
plebeian political culture was simply outside the scope of constitutional
protection for Addison.154

150. Similar language on the “common good” appeared in the constitutions of
Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), North Carolina (1776), Massachusetts (1780), and
New Hampshire (1783). See COGAN, supra note 144.
151. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 20.
152. See PRIMUS, supra note 146.
153. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793
(1998) (concluding that this type of language demonstrates that Founding-era texts routinely
employed language that was often both overinclusive and, in some cases, underinclusive).
While this claim may accurately describe how modern lawyers and judges, including
Volokh, typically read such statements, Addison’s interpretation of this language suggests
that judges in the Founding era did not read such provisions in the way Volokh describes.
See ADDISON, supra note 123. For Addison and others, the scope of the right was
understood to be shaped by the purpose of promoting the common good. Indeed, Volokh
makes no effort to try to understand how Founding-era readers, including judges, would
have construed such language. Moreover, Volokh shows no awareness at all that reading
texts historically requires abandoning the very modern models of legal reasoning he employs
to make sense of Founding-era texts. In short, Volokh’s entire approach rests on an
anachronistic model of textual exegesis. Compare Volokh’s approach with the holistic
model discussed supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text, as well as the model elaborated
in Gienapp, supra note 10.
154. The original draft of the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment also contained
similar language about the common good, but this clause was deleted. See COGAN, supra
note 144. The omission of references to the common good in the final version of the First
Amendment does not, however, mean that this conception vanished from American
constitutionalism. During the contentious debate over the meaning of the First Amendment
during the Alien and Sedition Crisis, many Federalists, including Addison, continued to
think about rights in a similar fashion. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST
MAN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 56–99 (1990). See generally
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND
PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988). For an
interesting critique of Levy’s historical scholarship on this topic, see David M. Rabban, The
Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,
37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). On the incompatibility of most modern First Amendment
doctrine and the original meanings and practices of the Founding generation, see Lawrence
Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common
Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011).
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V. HISTORICISM, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS
The analysis of Montgomery sketched in this Essay illustrates how a new
constitutional historicism, one influenced by a historically informed
constitutional ethnography, can help scholars make sense of the complexity
of constitutional ideas from the Founding without resorting to the
reductionist and anachronistic methods typical of most forms of
constitutional originalism.155 There was a range of different understandings
of the meaning of the rights to speak and assemble at play in Pennsylvania
during the Whiskey Rebellion. Two of those visions of law, a Federalist
ideology and a plebeian one, came directly into conflict in Montgomery.
Neither of these approaches to law resembles the modern rights-based
theories that define First Amendment theory in contemporary law.156
Federalists and plebeians each saw these rights as tied to an underlying
obligation to participate in public life and rally the public and its political
representatives when the common good required such interventions.
Federalists and plebeians parted ways when it came to interpreting and
applying this constitutional ideal. Making sense of the two opposing legal
cultures that came into conflict in Montgomery requires the type of holistic,
anthropological model of analysis elaborated in this Essay. The past really
is “a foreign country,” and many familiar legal concepts were understood in
radically different terms by members of the Founding generation.157
Recognizing this fact does not mean that judges, lawyers, and scholars
should abandon their interest in Founding-era constitutionalism.158 Given
the traditions of American constitutional law, particularly its favored
modalities of interpretation, some attention to history is almost

155. For an elaboration of the methodological flaws in contemporary originalist theory,
see Cornell, supra note 11.
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY 105–24 (1985). The
application of originalist insights to contemporary law, if done in an historically rigorous
fashion (assuming such a practice is even possible), would also undermine many other wellestablished features of modern constitutional law. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and
Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 392–93
(2007). The claim of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport that originalism produces
desirable outcomes is therefore hard to credit. See generally JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL
B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013) (assuming that the
Constitution has a firm supermajoritarian foundation). See also id. at 11 (asserting “that good
consequences are produced by a constitution that incorporates the core principles of the
liberal tradition and has the support of the people”). For a critique of the anachronistic and
simplistic assumptions that mar their approach to originalism, see Cornell, supra note 23.
For jurisprudential critiques, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of
History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2015) and
James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 515
(2014).
158. In this regard, the notion of holism discussed above points in the direction of a
translation model of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). For an elaboration of this connection, see Gienapp, supra note
10.
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inevitable.159 Yet, it is important when reading texts from the Founding era
to read them historically, not anachronistically.160 The goal of such
inquiries ought to be to understand the richness of the American
constitutional tradition and its evolving nature. The methods discussed
above provide one set of tools to help judges, lawyers, and scholars
accomplish that goal. Whatever role history comes to play in the future of
constitutional adjudication, it is important to get that history right before
engaging in the complex and separate task of judging how such insights
might or might not be applied to contemporary legal problems.

159. Text and history are two of the basic modalities of American constitutional
interpretation identified by Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982). For a thoughtful gloss on these, see Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and
Modalities: Meditations on Bobbit’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 157 (2008). For another useful typology of constitutional interpretation, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1189 (1987). Although textual arguments are not always dispositive, it is hard to
think of a mainstream constitutional theory that does not deal with text in some manner. See,
e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 47 (2001). Similarly, even
scholars opposed to originalism generally accord some role to history in interpreting the
Constitution. See Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword to IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE
EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT 8 (2009),
https://www.acslaw.org/pdf/ACS_Expounding_FNL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Y757-HBGE];
Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641
(2013).
160. For two different views of how judges ought to deal with history, see Martin S.
Flaherty, Foreword: Historians and the New Originalism: Contextualism, Historicism, and
Constitutional Meaning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 905 (2015) and Helen Irving, Outsourcing the
Law: History and the Disciplinary Limits of Constitutional Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
957 (2015).

